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Re´sume´
Cette note analyse le choix endoge`ne de leadership entre deux pays se faisant concurrence sur
la taxation des biens. Nous e´tudions un jeu d’e´che´ancier, dans lequel les pays choisissent de
faon cre´dible jouer comme meneur ou comme suiveur. Nous montrons que les e´quilibres par-
faits en sous-jeux correspondent aux deux e´quilibres de Stackelberg, ce qui pose un proble`me de
coordination. En se´lectionnant un de ces e´quilibres par le biais du crite`re de risque-dominance,
nous montrons que le petit pays doit mener. Si l’asyme´trie entre les deux pays est suffisante,
la Pareto-dominance renforce le crite`re de risque-dominance pour la se´lection de cet e´quilibre.
Nous en de´duisons deux re´sultats importants pour la litte´rature sur la concurrence fiscale :
quand les pays diffe`rent suffisamment par leurs tailles, la re`gle selon laquelle le grand pays taxe
plus ne tient pas; quand les pays sont similaires en taille, l’harmonisation fiscale par un taux
d’imposition unique commun aux deux pays s’instaure spontane´ment.
JEL Codes: C72, H30, H87.
Key-words: Concurrence fiscale, comple´mentarite´ strate´gigue, e´quilibre de Stackelberg, risque-
dominance.
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Abstract
This note investigates the endogenous choice of leadership in commodity tax competition. We
apply an endogenous timing game, where jurisdictions commit themselves to lead or to follow,
to the Kanbur and Keen (1993) model. We show that the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
(SPNE) correspond to the two Stackelberg situations, yielding to a coordination issue. Selecting
an equilibrium by means of the risk-dominance criterion, we prove that the smaller country has
to lead. If asymmetry among countries is sufficient, Pareto-dominance reinforces risk-dominance
in selecting the same SPE. We deduce two important results for the literature of tax competition:
when countries differ sufficiently by their size, the “big-country-higher-tax” rule does not hold
anymore; when countries are close in size, tax harmonization through a unique tax rate among
countries occurs without any international agreement.
JEL Codes: C72, H30, H87.
Key-words: Commitment; Commodity Tax Competition; Strategic Complements; Stackelberg
Equilibrium; Pareto Dominance; Risk Dominance.
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1 Introduction.
Taxes on consumption, such as excise taxes or Value Added Tax (VAT), are the most
important sources of fiscal revenues in the European Union, accounting for more than
30% of overall taxation in OECD member countries. However, indirect tax differentials
generate cross-border shopping, which constraints national governments in their tax policy
and induces them to compete on tax rates.
Mintz and Tulkens (1986) provide the first formal analysis of commodity tax competi-
tion in a two-country model. They highlight the inefficiencies which arise from uncoordi-
nated tax setting. Using a spatial representation of a two-country economy, Kanbur and
Keen (1993) pursue the analysis and show that the smaller country sets the lower tax rate.
This result, also called the “big-country-higher-tax-rate” rule, has been reinforced in the
commodity tax competition context1 by successive works such as Trandel (1994), Wang
(1999) and Nielsen (2001).2 However this rule is contradicted by several examples where
smaller countries set higher tax rates: Canada vis-a`-vis the US for income taxes, Denmark
and Germany or Ireland and United Kingdom for VAT.3 In order to contradict this rule,
several solutions have been advanced in the literature. In a model where N countries
are distributed along a representative segment, Ohsawa (1999) establishes a U-shape tax
structure where the peripheral countries set higher tax rates. Nielsen (2002) assumes
greater marginal costs of public funds in the smaller countries. Keen and Kotsogiannis
(2002) consider the evasion on commodity taxation.
In general, these authors consider tax competition as a simultaneous (or static) game,
where each country sets its tax policy, more specifically its tax rate, taking as given the
tax rates of their neighbors. However the realism of simultaneous moves of countries when
they decide their tax policy is questionnable. The sovereignty of countries gives them the
opportunity to commit themselves to fiscal decisions. For Schelling (1960), the concept of
1It also holds in other contexts as capital tax competition.
2The former author distinguishes countries by their size rather than by their population density, while
the latters assume that the large country decides on tax first.
3Remark that small countries like Denmark, Sweden and Finland set the highest VAT rates (25%,
25%, 22%, respectively) in the EU, while Germany or UK charge a relatively low VAT rate (19% and
15% respectively).
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commitment turns upon the sequence of moves. He writes (page 124)
“The commitment is a means of gaining first move in a game in which first
move carries an advantage; the threat is a commitment to a strategy for second
move.”
Commitment may be achieved by moving earlier than the opponent. But in some
environments acting after the other’s decision may be more profitable. A dilemma then
appears between committing to move early and forcing the others to best respond, and
moving late so as to be able to play a best response against the opponent.
The aim of this note is to extend the model of Kanbur and Keen (1993) by taking into
account the countries’ capacity to commit to their tax policy move. We use the endogenous
timing game, also named commitment game, proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).4
We establish several results which are direct consequences of the strategic complementarity
of national tax rates. Both countries have a second-mover advantage when they differ
little in size; otherwise, the smaller country has a first-mover advantage, while the larger
one prefers to follow. The Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPNE) are the two Stackelberg
situations where one of the two countries chooses first its tax rate, the other fixing its own
policy after observing the behavior of the former. It appears unambiguously that moving
sequentially is Pareto-improving compared to the standard simultaneous tax competition
game.
Since we have multiple equilibria, we apply two equilibrium selection criteria: Pareto-
dominance and Risk-dominance as defined by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). The SPNE
where the smaller country leads risk-dominates the other SPNE. This result questions the
relevance of the assumption advanced by Wang (1999) that the larger country leads. When
asymmetry among countries is sufficient, Pareto-dominance reinforces risk-dominance by
selecting the same SPNE. Two consequences follow which challenge existing results on
commodity tax competition. First, when countries differ sufficiently in size, the smaller
4Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2009) consider the capital taxation issue through a similar timing game.
Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) propose a taxonomy of international interactions depending on the sign
of the spillovers and the nature of interactions (substitutes/complements).
5
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.38
country sets a higher tax rate than the larger one at the risk-dominant SPNE. In other
terms, the “big-country-higher-tax-rate” rule does not hold anymore. Secondly, when
countries are close in size, both countries choose the same tax rate at the risk-dominant
SPNE. In this case, tax harmonization occurs whithout any international tax agreement.
The rest of the note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic framework
and the three simple games depending on the simultaneity or sequentiality of national
tax-setting. In section 3, we address the endogenous timing game: we determine the
SPNEs, highlighting a multiple equilibrium result; we then address the coordination issue
by using the criteria of Risk-dominance and Pareto-dominance. Section 4 concludes.
2 A model of commodity taxation.
In this section, we strictly use the model developed by Kanbur and Keen (1993) and
extended by Wang (1999).
2.1 The set-up.
We consider two countries, “home” and “foreign”, which might be represented by the
interval [−1, 1] with the border at the origin. The population is homogenous and uniformly
distributed. The size of the home (respectively foreign) country is h (respectively H), with
h 6 H . There is a single good consumed in both countries. Its pre-tax price is given and
is the same in both countries. The price tag incorporates the commodity tax rate set
by the country where the good is purchased. Each consumer buys one unit of the good.
A home consumer pays the pre-tax price plus the home excise tax (t) if she buys in
the home region; otherwise she pays the pre-tax price, the foreign excise tax (T ), and
the transportation cost (δs > 0) where s is the distance to the border and δ is the unit
transportation cost. A consumer of the home country purchases the good in the foreign
region if and only if
t− T
δ
> s and v − T − δs > 0,
6
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where v is the consumer’s reservation price. A similar setting applies to the foreign
consumer. We assume that
(i) v →∞ and (ii) δ < 2. (1)
The first condition insures that all agents will buy some goods and then pay the commodity
tax. The second condition involves that the tax rate is less than unity for any degree of
asymmetry, denoted by θ (θ = h/H ≤ 1).
The objective of each government is the maximization of its tax revenue. We then
have:
For t > T, r (t, T ) = th
(
1− t−T
δ
)
R (t, T ) = TH + Th t−T
δ
(2)
and
For t 6 T, r (t, T ) = th + tH T−t
δ
R (t, T ) = TH
(
1− T−t
δ
)
.
(3)
We note that tax rates are plain complements in the terminology of Eaton (2004) as
the payoff of a country increases in the tax rate of the other country: ∂r(t,T )
∂T
> 0 and
∂R(t,T )
∂t
> 0. 5
The game proposed by Kanbur and Keen (1993) is supermodular.6 This property
insures the existence of a Nash equilibrium. It is also equivalent to the strategic comple-
mentarity of the tax rates: the marginal utility derived from an increase of the tax rate
set by the home country is increasing in the tax rate of the foreign country.7
5This property always characterizes tax competition models, whatever the taxation basis (commodi-
ties, capital or labour).
6The supermodularity of the static game results from the supermodularity of the payoff functions.
Whatever t > T or T > t, we remark that the cross derivative of these functions is always positive:
∂2r(t,T )
∂t∂T
> 0 and ∂
2R(t,T )
∂t∂T
> 0.
7Several recent works focusing on the estimation of the fiscal reaction functions in an international
or federal context support the view that the slopes of reaction functions among countries are positive
(see for instance Egger, Pfaffermayr, and Winner (2005) or Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2007)).
Lockwood and Migali (2009) show that the degree of fiscal interactions has increased among european
countries since the the introduction of the Single Market in EU in 1993. They also observe that excise
taxes are strategic complements.
7
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.38
2.2 Comparing non-cooperative games.
We consider three non-cooperative games: the simultaneous Nash equilibrium and the
two Stackelberg ones, respectively denoted by ΓN , Γh, and ΓH . The first one has been
studied by Kanbur and Keen (1993), the Stackelberg equilibrium where the larger country
leads by Wang (1999), who also refers to the third one in a footnote.
The three basic games generate different tax rates. Drawing on these studies, we
establish a ranking of the equilibrium tax rates in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 Under condition (1), we have:
For θ < θc1,
{
tN < tF < tL
TN < TL < T F .
F or θ > θc1,
{
tN < tF < tL
TN < T F < TL,
where θc1 =
√
7−1
2
.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Consistent with the strategic complementarity property, tax rates in any Stackelberg
equilibrium are higher than the rates obtained at the Nash equilibrium. When the leader,
say the home country, increases its tax rate relative to the Nash equilibrium value, it
induces the follower, the foreign country, to increase its own tax rate because of the
strategic complementarity property. In turn, this increases the leader’s payoff because of
the plain complementarity of tax decisions. Hence we get tL > tN and T F > TN . However
it may happen that T F > TL. For a sufficient degree of asymmetry between country’ sizes
(θ < θc1), the interaction effects are much stronger from the foreign country, which is also
the larger one, to the home country, than from the home to to the foreign. Then tL is
very close to tN and TL is very far from TN as well as tF from tN . This explains the
obtained possible rankings. In brief, Lemma (1) shows that the tax competition yields
a lesser downward pressure in the sequential games than in the classic simultaneous one,
or equivalently that the presence of a leader mitigates the “race-to-the-bottom” feature.
8
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2.3 First-mover or second-mover advantages.
Given these rankings, we can now compare the payoffs in the three basic games (ΓN ,
Γh and ΓH), which will give us the opportunity of detecting potential first-mover or
second-mover advantages. We define these concepts as follows: player i has a first-mover
advantage (a second-mover advantage) if her equilibrium payoff in the Stackelberg game
in which she leads, is higher (lower) than in the Stackelberg game in which she follows.
Using these definitions, we establish the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 Under condition (1), we have:
For θ < θc2, the home (smaller) country has a first-mover advantage, while the foreign
(larger) country has a second-mover advantage.
For θ > θc2, both countries has a second-mover advantage.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
The foreign country, the larger one, has always a second-mover advantage. If countries’
sizes are close, both countries experiment a second-mover advantage. Being a follower
allows a country both to benefit from higher tax rates compared to the Nash equilibrium
and to have the lower tax rate, thus attracting cross-border shopping. In other terms, it
free-rides the leader even though this free-riding is less important than in the simultaneous
Nash game.
When asymmetry is sufficient (θ < θc2), the smaller country has a first-mover advan-
tage. By leading it expresses its relative weakness, which comes from its size relative
to the foreign country. The home country increases its tax rate with respect to its Nash
equilibrium level and then incites the foreign country to increase its tax rate too, by so
doing reducing the free-riding mechanism due to tax competition.
3 The endogenous timing game.
These results imply that the existence and identity of a leader matter a lot in the tax
competition race. Hence we would like to know the identity of the leader if it exists: is it
the home or foreign country? To answer this question, we turn to the endogenization of
9
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.38
moves, using a timing game.
3.1 The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE).
Following Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we consider an extended game, denoted by Γ˜
and defined as follows. At the first or “preplay” stage, players simultaneously and
non-cooperatively decide whether to move “early” or “late”. The players’ commitment
to this choice is perfect. The timing choice of each player is announced at the end of the
first stage. The second stage corresponds to the relevant tax competition game studied
in the previous section, which is deduced from the timing decision at the first stage: the
game
(
ΓN
)
if both players choose to move early or late; the Stackelberg game
(
Γh
)
if the
home country chooses to move early (strategy Early) while the foreign country chooses
to move late (strategy Late); the Stackelberg game
(
ΓH
)
if the timing of decisions is
reversed. This game can be expressed by the following 2× 2 normal form:8
Table 1: Normal form of the game Γ˜
Foreign country
Early Late
Home Early rN , RN rL, RF
country Late rF , RL rN , RN
From the preceding normal form of the game Γ˜, we obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 The Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria (SPNEs) correspond to the Stack-
elberg outcomes.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
The two possible Stackelberg equilibria are solutions to the timing game Γ˜. This comes
from the fact that in any case, both the first- and second-movers are better off than under a
Nash equilibrium. At the SPNEs, since tax rates are strategic complements, the tax rates
8We define: rN = r
(
tN , TN
)
, RN = R
(
tN , TN
)
, rF = r
(
tF
(
TL
)
, TL
)
, rL = r
(
tL, TF
(
tL
))
, RL =
R
(
tF
(
TL
)
, TL
)
, and RF = R
(
tL, TF
(
tL
))
.
10
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are in both countries superior to those established at the simultaneous Nash equilibrium.
The “race-to-bottom” is weaker as it is predicted in the standard tax competition model.
The SPNEs are Pareto-superior to the simultaneous Nash Equilibrium (W F,Li > W
N
i ).
Both countries have a common interest in avoiding the Nash tax rates, and they can do
so by resorting to non-synchronous moves, that is by accepting that one of them leads
the tax competition race.9
3.2 Risk-dominance.
Given the multiplicity of SPNEs of Γ˜, a coordination issue arises: how to select one of the
two possible solutions? To solve this issue, we can resort to two criteria in order to rank
the SPNEs: the Pareto-dominance and the risk-dominance criteria. Harsanyi and Selten
(1988) define the latter criterion as follows:
Definition 1 An equilibrium risk-dominates another equilibrium when the former is less
risky than the latter, that is the risk-dominant equilibrium is the one for which the product
of the deviation losses is the largest.
The equilibrium where the home country leads and the foreign one follows, denoted
by (Early, Late) , risk-dominates the equilibrium where the foreign country leads and the
home one follows, denoted by (Late, Early) , if the former is associated with the larger
product of deviation losses, or more formally, if and only if
Π =
(
rL − rN) (RF − RN)− (rF − rN) (RL −RN) > 0. (4)
Applying this definition we obtain the following Proposition
Proposition 3 Under condition (1),
1. The SPNE where the smaller country leads risk-dominates the other SPNE for every
value of θ.
2. For θ < θc2, the SPNE where the smaller country leads Pareto-dominates the other
SPNE.
9We remark that the equilibrium studied by Kanbur and Keen (1993) is not a Commitment Robust
Nash Equilibrium, as defined by van Damme and Hurkens (1996). For these authors, a Nash Equilibrium
is a Commitment Robust Nash Equilibrium, if and only if no country has a first-mover incentive.
11
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Proof. See Appendix B.6.
At the risk-dominant SPNE, the home country has to move early since it has more
to lose in the simultaneous game than the other country. The home country increases its
own tax rate compared to the Nash level, which will trigger a larger increase in the tax
rate of the foreign country because of the complementarity effect; on the other hand, if
the foreign country is a leader (Early), given that the home country as a follower (Late)
will not tend to act much, the gain of the foreign country as a leader with respect to the
Nash solution, is smaller. When the asymmetry is sufficient, the SPNE where the smaller
country leads is Pareto-superior to the other SPE. Indeed, the home country experiments
a first-mover advantage, while the other has a second-mover advantage. By leading and
fixing a higher tax rate, the home country encourages the foreign country to increase its
tax rate. Thus, Pareto-dominance reinforces risk-dominance when asymmetry between
countries is sufficient.
An imediate Corolloray of our results is the following:
Corollary 1 At the risk-dominant SPNE (Early, Late), we have
tL = T F for θ 6
1
2
,
and
tL > T F for θ >
1
2
.
Proof. See Appendix B.7.
While at the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, the larger country always sets the highest
tax rate due to its relatively low elasticity of tax base to the tax rate, it sets the lowest
tax rate at the risk-dominant SPNE when θ is bigger than 1/2. When countries differ
sufficiently in size like Denmark and Germany for instance, the following larger country
extracts more revenues by undercutting the tax rate of the leading smaller country and
attracting more consumers. Thus, the “big-country-higher-tax-rate” rule, which was first
emphasized by Bucovetsky (1991) in the context of capital taxation, does not hold any-
12
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.38
more. A final comment for this case is to highlight that the ex ante advantage in size of
the larger country is reinforced through the second-mover advantage.
When the countries’ sizes are close, like France and Germany for instance, the larger
country is able to stem off the crowding out of consumers by setting the same rate as
the leading country.10 Tax harmonization, defined as a unique tax rate among countries,
then occurs without any international tax agreement and cross-border shopping obviously
disappears.
4 Conclusion.
This paper adopts the approach of Kanbur and Keen (1993) to apprehend commodity tax
competition. Applying the endogenous timing game developed by Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990), we endogeneize the sequence of players’ moves. We establish that the smaller
country sets first its tax rate at the risk-dominant Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
This impacts on the outcome of the tax competition race. The “big-country-higher-tax”
rule does not hold anymore: when countries’ sizes are sufficiently different, the smaller
country sets higher tax rate than the larger country. When sizes are sufficiently close,
then the two countries set an identical tax rate and tax harmonization occurs.
We have highlighted the importance of the second-mover advantage in tax competition.
An extension of our analysis would be to determine how a country can commit to a second
move as far as its tax policy is concerned. For instance, a ratification requirement has
been seen as a commitment’s device to a second move in international negotiations. We
can note that the political process of tax policy markedly differs across countries and gives
governments more or less commitment capacity in their decisions on tax rates.
10The VAT rates which were respectively 20% for France and 11% for Germany in 1973, converge to
19, 6% for France and 19% for Germany in 2009.
13
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A Appendix.
Borrowing from Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Wang (1999), the following results obtain.
The best-reply correspondances obtain:
t (T ) =
{
1
2 (δ + T ) if T > δ
√
θ
1
2 (δθ + T ) if T 6 δ
√
θ
and
T (t) =

1
2 (δ + t) if t 6 δ
t if δ 6 t 6 δ
θ
1
2
(
δ
θ
+ t
)
if t > δ
θ
.
Hence the solution of the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium is:{
tN = δ3 (1 + 2θ)
TN = δ3 (2 + θ)
(5)
and {
r
(
tN , TN
)
= δ9H (1 + 2θ)
2
R
(
TN , tN
)
= δ9H (2 + θ)
2 .
(6)
The solution to the Stackelberg game where the home country leads, is:
tL = TF = δ
θ
for θ 6 12 ,{
tL = δ
(
1 + 12θ
)
TF = 12δ
(
1 + 32θ
) for θ > 12 , (7)
and
r
(
tL, TF
)
=
{
Hδ if θ 6 12
δh
8
(
2 + 1
θ
)2
if θ > 12
.
R
(
tL, TF
)
=
{
H δ
θ
if θ 6 12
δh
16
(
2 + 3
θ
)2
if θ > 12
(8)
The solution to the Stackelberg game where the foreign country leads, is:{
tF = δ2
(
1 + 32θ
)
TL = δ2 (2 + θ)
(9)
and {
r
(
tF , TL
)
= δ16H (2 + 3θ)
2
R
(
tF , TL
)
= δ8H (2 + θ)
2
.
(10)
Comparing the tax rates, From (12), (14) and (16), we get:
tN < tF < tL
and
TN < TL < TF for θ < θc1 =
√
7− 1
2
≈ 0.822876,
TN < TF < TL for θ ≥ θc1.
16
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From (13), (15) and (17), we can derive the first-mover or second-mover advantages:
For θ ∈ [0, 1] ,
R
(
tL, TF
)
> R
(
tF , TL
)
.
If θ < θc2 ≈ 0.68896,
r
(
tL, TF
)
> r
(
tF , TL
)
.
If θ > θc2,
r
(
tL, TF
)
6 r
(
tF , TL
)
.
From Proposition 1, (13), (15) and (17), we get:
R
(
tF , TL
)
> R
(
tN , TN
)
and R
(
tL, TF
)
> R
(
tN , TN
)
,
r
(
tF , TL
)
> r
(
tN , TN
)
and r
(
tL, TF
)
> r
(
tN , TN
)
.
When the home country plays Early, the foreign always prefers to follows; if the foreign plays Late, the
home country prefers to lead. Thus the Stackelberg situation where the home country leads is a SPNE.
In a similar way, we establish that the other Stackelberg outcome is a SPNE too.
We are now able to apply the risk-dominance criterion and prove (1) :
If θ < 12 ,
Π =
(2 + θ)
(
512− 744θ− 12θ2 + 162θ3 + 55θ4
)
1152θ
δ2H2 > 0.
If θ > 12 ,
Π =
81 + 296θ + 136θ2 − 400θ3 − 248θ4 + 80θ5 + 55θ6
1152θ2
δ2H2 > 0.
The proof of (2) is immediate from Proposition 1.
Finally, the Stackelberg equilibrium when the home country leads
(
tL, TF
)
is characterized by:11
tL = tF =
δ
θ
for θ 6
1
2
,
and {
tL = δ
(
1 + 12θ
)
TF = δ2
(
1 + 32θ
) for θ > 1
2
.

B Detailed Appendix.
This appendix develops the previous one and is not for publication.
B.1 The best-reply correspondances.
All proofs presented in this appendix summmarize or elaborate on results obtained in Kanbur and Keen
(1993) and Wang (1999).
• Assuming t > T , the objective functions are given by expressions (2). We obtain the following
11This result is already presented in footnote 5, p.976, in Wang (1999) paper.
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best-reply correspondences which correspond to interior solutions:
∂r (t, T )
∂t
= 0⇔ t (T ) = 1
2
(δ + T ) .
∂R (t, T )
∂T
= 0⇔ T (t) = 1
2
(
δ
θ
+ t
)
.
These results hold if:
t > T ⇔
{
T 6 δ
t > δ
θ
.
• Assuming t 6 T , the objective functions are given by expressions (3). We have:
∂r (t, T )
∂t
= 0⇔ t (T ) = 1
2
(δθ + T )
∂R (t, T )
∂T
= 0⇔ T (t) = 1
2
(δ + t) .
These results hold if:
t 6 T ⇔
{
T > δθ
t 6 δ.
• Assuming t = T , the objective functions may be given by expressions (2) or (3). However the
best-reply functions correspond to corner solutions. For instance, we consider the case where t > T
and then expressions (2). We get:
∂r (t, T )
∂t
6 0⇔ t > δ
∂R (t, T )
∂T
> 0⇔ t 6 δ
θ
.
Thus we get:
T = t for δ 6 t 6
δ
θ
.
• For δθ 6 T 6 δ, comparing the objective function levels of the home country, we conclude:
For t > T, r
(
1
2
(δ + T ) , T
)
=
H
4δ
(T + δθ)
2
.
For t 6 T, r
(
1
2
(δθ + T ) , T
)
=
h
4δ
(T + δ)
2
.
Thus:
r
(
1
2
(δ + T ) , T
)
> r
(
1
2
(δθ + T ) , T
)
⇔ T > δ
√
θ.
In brief, we obtain:
t (T ) =
{
1
2 (δ + T ) if T > δ
√
θ
1
2 (δθ + T ) if T 6 δ
√
θ
and
T (t) =

1
2 (δ + t) if t 6 δ
t if δ 6 t 6 δ
θ
1
2
(
δ
θ
+ t
)
if t > δ
θ
.

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B.2 The resolution of the three basic games.
B.2.1 Nash non-cooperative Equilibrium.
1. Assuming T 6 δ
√
θ, we get: t (T ) = 12 (δ + T ).
• For t 6 δ, T (t) = 12 (δ + t) and T < t, we obtain by substitution:
T = δ = t,
which is valid only if θ = 1.
• For δ < t < δ
θ
, T (t) = t, we obtain by substitution:
T = δ = t,
which contradicts δ < t < δ
θ
.
• For t > δ
θ
, T (t) = 12
(
δ
θ
+ T
)
and t < T , we obtain by substitution:
{
T = δ3
(
1 + 2
θ
)
t = δ3
(
2 + 1
θ
)
which is impossible since δ3
(
2 + 1
θ
)
6
δ
θ
contradicts the assumption t > δ
θ
.
2. Assuming T > δ
√
θ, we get: t (T ) = 12 (δθ + T ).
• For t 6 δ, T (t) = 12 (δ + t) and T < t, we obtain by substitution:{
TN = δ3 (2 + θ)
tN = δ3 (1 + 2θ)
(11)
which is valid, since the conditions T > δ
√
θ and t 6 δ hold.
• For δ < t < δ
θ
, T (t) = t, we obtain by substitution:
T = t = δθ,
which contradicts δ 6 t if θ < 1.
• For t > δ
θ
, T (t) = 12
(
δ
θ
+ t
)
and t < T , we obtain by substitution: T
N = δ3θ
(
θ2 + 2
)
tN = δ3θ
(
2θ2 + 1
)
which contradicts t > δ
θ
for θ < 1.
To sum up, we get: {
tN = δ3 (1 + 2θ)
TN = δ3 (2 + θ)
(12)
and {
r
(
tN , TN
)
= δ9H (1 + 2θ)
2
R
(
TN , tN
)
= δ9H (2 + θ)
2
.
(13)

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B.2.2 Stackelberg equilibrium where the home country leads.
1. For t 6 δ, T (t) = 12 (δ + t) and t 6 T , the objective function of the leader becomes:
r (t, T (t)) = th+ tH
δ − t
2δ
.
Since t 6 δ, we get:
∂r (t, T (t))
∂t
=
2δh+Hδ − 2tH
2δ
>
H
2
(2θ − 1) > 0.
If θ > 1/2, we get:
tL = δ = TF .
An interior solution exists if and only if: θ 6 1/2.
∂r (t, T (t))
∂t
=
2δh+Hδ − 2tH
2δ
= 0
which yields: {
tL = δ
(
θ + 12
)
TF = δ2
(
θ + 32
)
where TF > tL ⇔ δ2
(
θ + 32
)
> δ
(
θ + 12
)⇔ θ 6 12 .
2. For δ 6 t 6 δ
θ
, T (t) = t, the objective function of the leader is equal to:
r (t, T (t)) = th,
and
∂r (t, T (t))
∂t
= h > 0,
tL = TF =
δ
θ
.
3. For δ
θ
6 t, T (t) = 12
(
δ
θ
+ t
)
and t > T , the objective function of the leader becomes:
r (t, T (t)) = th
(
1− 1
2δ
(
t− δ
θ
))
,
and then
∂r (t, T (t))
∂t
=
h
2δ
[
2δ +
δ
θ
− 2t
]
.
Since δ
θ
6 t, we get:
∂r (t, T (t))
∂t
6
h
2θ
(2θ − 1) 6 0⇔ θ 6 1
2
⇔ tL = δ
θ
= TF .
If θ > 12 , there is then an interior solution which yields:{
tL = δ
(
1 + 12θ
)
TF = 12δ
(
1 + 32θ
)
where TF < tL ⇔ δ2
(
1 + 32θ
)
< δ
(
1 + 12θ
)⇔ θ > 12 .
4. From the previous analysis, we have to compare the payoff levels in several cases.
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For θ 6 12 ,
r
(
δ
θ
,
δ
θ
)
= δH > r
(
δ
(
θ +
1
2
)
,
δ
2
(
θ +
3
2
))
=
δH
8
(2θ + 1)
2
.
For θ > 12 ,
r (δ, δ) = δh < r
(
δ
(
1 +
1
2θ
)
,
1
2
δ
(
1 +
3
2θ
))
=
δh
8
(
2 +
1
θ
)2
.
To summarize, we obtain:
tL = TF = δ
θ
for θ 6 12 ,{
tL = δ
(
1 + 12θ
)
TF = 12δ
(
1 + 32θ
) for θ > 12 , (14)
and
r
(
tL, TF
)
=
{
Hδ if θ 6 12
δh
8
(
2 + 1
θ
)2
if θ > 12
.
R
(
tL, TF
)
=
{
H δ
θ
if θ 6 12
δh
16
(
2 + 3
θ
)2
if θ > 12
(15)

B.2.3 Stackelberg equilibrium where the foreign leads.
1. For T 6 δ
√
θ, t (T ) = 12 (δ + T ) and t > T , the objective function of the foreign country is then:
R (T, t (T )) = TH + Th
δ − T
2δ
∂R (T, t (T ))
∂T
=
2δH + hδ − 2hT
2δ
>
2δH + hδ − 2hδ
√
θ
2δ
=
2
(
H − h
√
θ
)
+ h
2
> 0,
and then {
TL = δ
√
θ
tF = δ2
(
1 +
√
θ
)
which satisfies t > T .
2. For T > δ
√
θ, t (T ) = 12 (δθ + T ) and T 6 t, the objective function of the foreign country is then:
R (T, t (T )) = TH
(
1− T − δθ
2δ
)
,
∂R (T, t (T ))
∂T
= H
(
1− T − δθ
2δ
)
− TH
2δ
= 0.
To summarize, we obtain: {
tF = δ2
(
1 + 32θ
)
TL = δ2 (2 + θ)
(16)
and {
r
(
tF , TL
)
= δ16H (2 + 3θ)
2
R
(
tF , TL
)
= δ8H (2 + θ)
2
.
(17)

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B.3 Comparing the tax rates.
From (12), (14) and (16), we get:
tN < tF < tL
and
TN < TL < TF for θ < θc1 =
√
7− 1
2
≈ 0.822876,
TN < TF < TL for θ ≥ θc1.

B.4 First-mover or second-mover advantage
From (13), (15) and (17), we get:
For θ ∈ [0, 1] ,
R
(
tL, TF
)
> R
(
tF , TL
)
.
If θ < θc2 ≈ 0.68896,
r
(
tL, TF
)
> r
(
tF , TL
)
.
If θ > θc2,
r
(
tL, TF
)
6 r
(
tF , TL
)
.

B.5 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium(s)
From Proposition 1, (13), (15) and (17), we get:
R
(
tF , TL
)
> R
(
tN , TN
)
and R
(
tL, TF
)
> R
(
tN , TN
)
,
r
(
tF , TL
)
> r
(
tN , TN
)
and r
(
tL, TF
)
> r
(
tN , TN
)
.
When the home country plays Early, the foreign always prefers to follows; if the foreign plays Late, the
home country prefers to lead. Thus the Stackelberg situation where the home country leads is a SPNE.
In a similar way, we establish that the other Stackelberg outcome is a SPNE too.
B.6 Risk dominance
First, we establish the proof of (1) :
If θ < 12 ,
Π =
(2 + θ)
(
512− 744θ− 12θ2 + 162θ3 + 55θ4
)
1152θ
δ2H2 > 0.
If θ > 12 ,
Π =
81 + 296θ + 136θ2 − 400θ3 − 248θ4 + 80θ5 + 55θ6
1152θ2
δ2H2 > 0.
The proof of (2) is immediate from Proposition 1.
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B.7 The ”big-country-higher-tax” rule
The Stackelberg equilibrium when the home country leads
(
tL, TF
)
is characterized by:12
tL = tF =
δ
θ
for θ 6
1
2
,
and {
tL = δ
(
1 + 12θ
)
TF = δ2
(
1 + 32θ
) for θ > 1
2
.

12This result is already presented in footnote 5, p.976, in Wang (1999) paper.
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